This book presents three main arguments about Russian-Japanese relations from 2000-2016 and contends hat the lack of incentives for reconciliation by 2035 was a consequence of factors exogenous and endogenous to each government. No War, No Peace, No Incentives asserts that strides toward genuine, enduring reconciliation by 2035 only could have proceeded from resolution of the territorial and peace treaty disputes but thereafter would have required extensive purposeful reparation of political, economic and strategic (including military) relations to persevere. Second, this book contends that the lack of incentives for reconciliation - as qualified above - by 2035 was a consequence of factors exogenous and endogenous to each government. This book's third main argument also concerns elite aversion to settlement of the Southern Kurils and peace treaty issues from 2000-2016 and thus qualified for both governments as a major endogenous disincentive for reconciliation.