This dissertation is comprised of three papers which consider prominent issues inbioethics. The three topics can be briefly stated as: 1) a refutation of the responsibilityobjection to abortion, 2) a rejection of the orthodox bioethical arguments attempting to justifyremoval of artificial nutrition and hydration from persistent vegetative state patients, and 3) ademand to revise the current orthodox criteria for determining death.The Responsibility Objection to Abortion is a common and prominent objection toabortion in general. The objection claims that a woman is responsible for the fetus growinginside her body as a result of her willing participation in sexual activity. I argue that theResponsibility Objection to Abortion fails to establish that a woman must provide care to herunborn fetus. I do so by examining the various iterations in which the responsibility objectionhas been presented and then identifying the particular conception of responsibility that eachiteration of the objection must be utilizing in order to ground the particular version of theobjection. My contention is that once examined in this manner I am able to demonstrate thateach iteration of the objection is unable to establish an obligation to provide care on the part ofa pregnant woman to her unborn fetus. Thus, the responsibility objection ceases to be a seriousobjection to a woman's reproductive freedom.