The erosion of America‟s industrial base since World War II has affected national security by decreasing the available production and intellectual capacity. Some factors attributing to this phenomenon are the reduction in the number of firms in the defense industry, budgetary issues brought about by today‟s fiscally constrained environment, the practice of outsourcing capabilities overseas, the lack of a threat to state survival, and the increased specialization of the defense industrial base. Additionally, the defense acquisition organizational structure is out of balance. To function efficiently and effectively, defense acquisition must strike a balance between the requirements generation and approval process, the budgeting process, and the method by which defense acquisition professionals acquire materiel solutions. However, the lack of common oversight, prioritization and the conflicting timelines of the three decision support systems affect national security by limiting the options and capabilities available to the warfighter. To this point, Department of Defense leadership has tried to remedy the problem by placing emphasis on reforming how defense acquisition professionals go about procuring weapon systems under the auspices of "acquisition reform." However, acquisition professionals and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership are wasting their time because the current effort simply addresses symptoms of the problem, not the problem itself. The real dilemma in the defense acquisition system is the incompatibility in the "reward system" of the various stakeholders in defense acquisitions. Solving the overall problems in the defense acquisition enterprise requires a more robust and flexible industrial base, more interaction and harmony between the acquisition decision support systems and adequately addressing the core interests of the various stakeholders in the defense acquisition enterprise. Until then, the acquisitions community will never see true reform.